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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 4, 2011, a grand jury from Centre County, Penn-
sylvania, issued a report that set in motion a series of events that
would permanently alter the landscape of Pennsylvania's evidence
law.' The report detailed the sexual abuse suffered by eight young
boys at the hands of former Penn State University football coach
Gerald "Jerry" Sandusky, who met all of his victims through his
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cluding this article, possible. I would also like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Jane
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charity for children.2 On November 5, 2011, Sandusky was arrested
on 48 charges stemming from his systematic and repeated sexual
abuse of the eight victims identified in the grand jury report.3
At Sandusky's trial in 2012, several victims testified to odd be-
haviors exhibited by Sandusky in attempts to gain their trust before
he began sexually abusing them.4 According to the victims,
Sandusky would often shower with them naked and initiate "soap
battles" wherein he would "bear-hug" them.5 The victims testified
that he also wrestled and "play-box[ed]" with them during these in-
cidents.6 As substantiated by documents admitted into evidence at
trial, Sandusky also wrote "love letters" to victims, detailing his af-
fection for the young boys.7
While the victims were key witnesses in the prosecution's case
against Sandusky, psychologist Dr. Elliot Atkins was a key witness
for the defense.8 Dr. Atkins testified that Sandusky's bizarre, inap-
propriate behaviors did not show that Sandusky was a predator;
rather, Dr. Atkins testified that the behaviors showed that
Sandusky suffered from Histrionic Personality Disorder.9 Accord-
ing to Dr. Atkins, Sandusky's disorder is characterized by "exces-
sively sexual or flirtatious behavior" in order to obtain attention
from others.10 Dr. Atkins therefore opined that certain behaviors,
such as the love letters, were merely a manifestation of Sandusky's
disorder rather than an indication that he had sexual or romantic
feelings towards the victims."
2. Id.
3. Joe Drape, Penn State's Sandusky Convicted of Sexually Abusing Boys, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2012, at Al. A subsequent investigation conducted by Louis Freeh, former director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, implicated several other high-ranking Penn State
University officials for failing to report information regarding Sandusky's crimes. See Rich-
ard Perez-Pena, In Report, Failures Throughout Penn State, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at
B12:
In an investigation lasting more than seven months, [Freeh] found a legendary football
coach bending his supposed bosses to his will, a university staff that was mostly una-
ware of its legal duties to report violence and sexual abuse, and a university president
who hid problems from the board of trustees and was guided by a fear of bad publicity.
Freeh's report also criticized the university's culture at large, noting that the failure of uni-
versity officials to properly address Sandusky's conduct "reveals numerous individual fail-
ings, but [] also reveals weaknesses of the university's culture, governance, administration,
compliance policies and procedures for protecting children." Id.
4. Maureen Dowd, American Horror Story, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2012, at A27.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Richard Perez-Pena, At Trial, Sandusky's Wife Comes to His Defense, N.Y. TIMES,






Expert Testimony on RTS
The prosecution did not present a similar expert to testify as to
the seemingly bizarre behaviors of Sandusky's victims, who often
stayed in touch with Sandusky, continued to spend nights at his
residence, and even sent him Father's Day cards after being repeat-
edly sexually abused.12 Without a proper understanding of the im-
pact of sexual abuse on victims, the jury was left to surmise as to
why the victims would act as such. The prosecution did not forgo
introducing an expert witness by choice; Pennsylvania law ex-
pressly forbade it.13
Until 2012, Pennsylvania was the only state in the country pro-
hibiting the admission of expert testimony in criminal trials to ex-
plain the effects of sexual assault on victims. 1 4 For decades, victim
advocacy groups and sex crimes prosecutors have supported Penn-
sylvania's decision to allow expert testimony in sex crimes cases be-
cause jurors often possess "preconceived notions about how victims
behave after an assault"-notions based on longstanding, inaccu-
rate "rape myths."1 5 Proponents of the bill argue that allowing for
expert testimony about victim behavior, namely the effects of Rape
Trauma Syndrome ("RTS"), would provide a proper contextual
framework within which the jury could determine credibility with-
out reliance on erroneous and often harmful myths about victims.1 6
Opponents of the admission of expert testimony cite three pre-
dominant concerns in their criticism of laws like Pennsylvania's.
First, they raise arguments that the admission of such testimony
allows experts to make credibility determinations from the stand,
essentially telling the jury that they should believe the victim.1 7
12. Mitchell Culler, Bill that would allow expert witness testimony in sex abuse cases
heads to Corbett's desk, THE DAILY COLLEGIAN (June 25, 2012), http://www.colle-
gian.psu.edularchives/article cle8cl5d-5eb0-579e-b28f-466d76f22al2.html. See also Jessica
Tully, Pennsylvania to Allow Expert Testimony in Sex Abuse Trials, USA TODAY (June 29,
2012) (on file with author).
13. 42 PA. CON. STAT. § 5920(b) (2012).
14. Tully, supra note 12.
15. Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, Expert Testimony in Sexual Assault Cases,
PENNSYLVANIA COALITION AGAINST RAPE, 1 (June 18, 2013), http://www.pcar.org/sites/de-
fault/files/docs/Expert%/`20Testimony-%/`20position%/`2Ostatement.pdf.
16. Holly Hogan, The False Dichotomy of Rape Trauma Syndrome, 12 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 529, 533 (2006).
17. Tully, supra note 12; David McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regard-
ing Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1143, 1206 (1985).
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Opponents therefore contend that the law permits improper "bol-
stering" of victim testimony,1 8 which occurs when a party offers ev-
idence only for the purpose of enhancing a victim's credibility. 19
Second, opponents raise concerns that the law does not satisfy the
standard for admission of expert testimony.20 Most critically, they
believe that the testimony does not satisfy the "helpfulness" re-
quirement because sexual assault and a victim's response to sexual
assault is within the ken of lay jurors.21 Lastly, opponents typically
voice concerns regarding unfair prejudice.22 Many opponents, par-
ticularly defense attorneys, suggest that allowing an expert to tes-
tify on this subject matter invests an "aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness" into the testimony, making jurors more likely to
believe it and thus unfairly prejudicing the defendant.23
This note explores how House Bill 1264 will level the playing field
for Pennsylvania sexual assault victims, while avoiding the draw-
backs cited by critics of statutes allowing such expert testimony.
Section II explores the longstanding rape myths that have histori-
cally colored society's understanding of rape and have created the
need for updated legislation. It also explains RTS and its admissi-
bility in criminal trials over the past several decades, and describes
how Pennsylvania law and jurisprudence has failed to insulate
criminal trials from the effects of harmful rape myths.
Section III analyzes whether the law implicates any of the con-
cerns raised by opponents, or whether it serves its intended pur-
pose-to "level the playing field" for victims of sexual assault. First,
the section examines the admission of RTS expert testimony
18. Matt Mangino, The Cautionary Instruction: PA allows expert witnesses in sex offense
prosecutions, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 6, 2012), http://www.communityvoices.post-
gazette.com/news/ipso-facto/33612-the-cautionary-instruction-pa-allows-expert-witnesses-
in-sex-offense-prosecutions.
19. "In a criminal case, improper bolstering of a witness's testimony occurs when the
jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor is indicating a personal belief in the wit-
ness's credibility." 33A FED. PROC., L. ED. § 80:111 (2014).
20. See Helen J. Lauderdale, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1366, 1376-77 (1984).
21. Id. at 1394-95.
22. McCord, supra note 17, at 1204-06.
23. Id. at 1205. Some jurisdictions maintain that expert testimony concerning victim
responses to rape are unfairly prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230
(Minn. 1982). In Saldana, defendant was tried on charges stemming from his alleged sexual
assault of a victim who did not report her rape immediately and was an acquaintance of the
defendant. Id. at 229. At trial, a counselor for sexual assault victims testified to the typical
"post-rape symptoms and behavior of rape victims." Id. The court ultimately held that "[p]er-
mitting a person in the role of an expert to suggest that because the complainant exhibits
some of the symptoms of rape trauma syndrome the complainant was therefore raped, un-
fairly prejudices the [defendant-] appellant by creating an aura of special reliability and trust-
worthiness." Id. at 230.
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through the lens of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and the
Frye2 4 standard, particularly the helpfulness requirement.25 Sec-
ond, the section discusses the two different approaches to RTS tes-
timony, identifies the scheme adopted by Pennsylvania, and ex-
plores whether the scheme infringes upon the jury's role as fact-
finder. Finally, the section addresses whether RTS testimony ad-
mitted under Pennsylvania's statutory scheme unfairly prejudices
the defendant. This note concludes with a summary of analytical
findings as to the future applicability and permissible scope of ex-
pert testimony under the law.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Rape Myths
Society has "a long history of holding persistent and harmful
myths about rape and those who are victimized by it."26 These
myths have shifted society's focus away from the rapist to the vic-
tim, and rape trials often focus just as much, if not more so, on the
behavior of the victim than on the behavior of the rapist.27 There
are three general categories of rape myths, which have and con-
tinue to form the basis for laypersons' misconceptions about victims'
responses to sexual assault.2 8 The first type of rape myth concerns
the rapist.2 9 Rapists are often depicted as a "sex-starved maniac
lurking in the shadows and attacking without warning," when in
reality, the vast majority of victims know their attackers-they are
24. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923). Until 1993, the Frye test was the
dominant test in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. Alice B. Lustre, Anno-
tation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in
State, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001). In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993), which "enunciated a new
standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, establishing a 'gate-
keeping' role for federal district courts and enunciating several factors to be considered in
determining the admissibility of new scientific evidence." Lustre, supra. Many states have
adopted the Daubert standard; Pennsylvania, however, continues to apply the Frye standard.
Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1047 (Pa. 2003) (reaffirming Pennsylvania's adher-
ence to the Frye rule).
25. See PA. R. EVID. 702(b) ("the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue").
26. Laura E. Boeschen et al., Rape Trauma Experts in the Courtroom, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y, & L. 414, 414 (1998).
27. Id.
28. Christopher Emrich, The Playboy Defense in Philadelphia: How Pennsylvania Con-
tinues to Thwart Fair and Effective Sexual Assault Prosecutions by Refusing to Admit Expert
Testimony about Rape Trauma Syndrome, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 891, 897-99 (2009).
29. Id. at 897.
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often intimate partners, friends, or family members.30 The second
type of rape myth concerns the victim. 3 1 Rape victims are often de-
picted as women whose conduct, such as their dress, alcohol con-
sumption, or prior sexual conduct, invites unwanted sexual con-
tact.32 The final type of rape myth concerns the rape itself.3 3 Many
people believe that if a woman did not physically resist her attacker
during the course of a rape, she could not have been raped.34
These rape myths form the basis for jurors' expectations about
how a victim should behave after a sexual assault, including, but
not limited to the belief that the victim should be extremely emo-
tional or hysterical after the incident.35 Most notably, jurors also
often believe a "real victim"-one who is raped by a stranger, did
not invite the conduct, and physically resisted the rape-would
have immediately reported the assault to the police.36 When a vic-
tim does not behave in this way, jurors perceive a victim's behavior
30. Id. at 897-98. See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Re-
quirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual As-
sault, 52 (Villanova Univ. Sch. of L. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 20, 2004) (asserting:
"When people think about rape, most imagine a stereotypical scenario. They picture a ...
stranger jumping out of the bushes, dragging an innocent ... woman into a dark alley, beat-
ing her viciously, and raping her."); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths
and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1023 (1991)
("the public strongly embraces the myth that rapists are 'sick, emotionally disturbed' men").
31. Emrich, supra note 28, at 898.
32. Id. See Torrey, supra note 30, at 1015 (familiar rape myths include the belief that
women are 'asking for it' when they wear provocative clothes, go to bars alone, or simply
walk down the street at night").
33. Emrich, supra note 28, at 898.
34. Id. at 899 (explaining that "[m]any believe that a woman who was fully conscious,
but did not resist, was not raped").
35. Kimberly A. Lonsway, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Cases Involving Sexual Assault,
MINNESOTA CENTER AGAINST VIOLENCE AND ABUSE (March 2005), http://www.min-
cava.umn.eduldocuments/commissioned/svandexpertwitnesses/svandexpertwitnesses.html.
See generally Torrey, supra note 30, at 1014-15 (explaining how rape myths are barriers to
the effective prosecution of rape).
36. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION ET AL., INTRODUCING EXPERT
TESTIMONY TO EXPLAIN VICTIM BEHAVIOR IN SEXUAL AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROSECUTIONS (2007), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/pub introducing experttesti-
mony.pdf. The reality is, however, that "most victims never report the crime of rape." See
Torrey, supra note 30, at 1029 (explaining that an empirical study suggests that only 3 % of
victims ever report a rape to the police). Victims do not report rape for a variety of reasons,
including, but not limited to, shame, fear, and the desire to avoid a lengthy trial process that
could "provoke ... responses in the victim similar to those caused by the actual rape." Id.
at 1029-30. Interestingly, Pennsylvania jury instructions aid in perpetuating the myth that
victims immediately report their assaults. See Failure to Make a Prompt Complaint in Cer-
tain Sexual Offenses, PA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM), § 4.13A (2012). See Torrey,
supra note 30, at 1041:
[C]lose examination of the prompt complaint requirement reveals that it is based on
rape myths . . . . Because of the commonly held view that it was "natural" for a rape
victim to complain as soon as possible after the assault, in the absence of such a report
made to a third party the rape charge was assumed to be a fabrication created by a
vindictive complainant.
Winter 2016 Expert Testimony on RTS
as "counterintuitive,37 and therefore, compelling evidence of [his or
her] lack of credibility." 3 8
B. Rape Trauma Syndrome and its Admissibility
In reality, the belief that a sexual assault victim's counterintui-
tive behaviors are indicative of a lack of credibility are far from ac-
curate.39 RTS is a disorder characterized by a "variety of post-rape
physical and emotional traits that many victims share"40 and is
helpful in explaining the behaviors of victims immediately after the
rape and the long-term impact of rape on victims. 4 1 Researchers
Section 4.13A of the Standard Jury Instructions for Pennsylvania provide, in pertinent part:
The evidence of [name of victim]'s [failure to complain] [delay in making a complaint]
does not necessarily make [his] [her] testimony unreliable, but may remove from it the
assurance of reliability accompanying the prompt complaint or outcry that the victim
of a crime such as this would ordinarily be expected to make. Therefore, the [failure
to complain] [delay in making a complaint] should be considered in evaluating [his]
[her] testimony and in deciding whether the act occurred [at all] [with or without [his]
[her] consent].
Failure to Make a Prompt Complaint in Certain Sexual Offenses, PA. STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM), § 4.13A (2012). This instruction is appropriate where "the evidence
suggests that an alleged victim, otherwise competent and able to do so, did not promptly
report a sexual offense." Failure to Make a Prompt Complaint in Certain Sexual Offenses,
PA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM), § 4.13A (2012), Advisory Committee Note.
"The empirical research ... documents a reality in which women do not promptly
report a rape." Torrey, supra note 30, at 1042. However, persistent rape myths about the
promptness of a complaint remain pervasive in both the prosecutor's decision to bring
charges and the ultimate outcome of the case. See id. at 1043 (explaining that "police inves-
tigators and prosecutors . . . actively seek evidence of a prompt complaint" and that "[a] na-
tional survey of prosecutors revealed that promptness of complaint was the third most im-
portant factor in the decision to make a criminal charge, following only proof of penetration
and physical force").
37. The term "counterintuitive" is not a psychological term used to define a victim's be-
havior. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra note 36, at 11. Rather,
it defines "the public's perceptions of victim's behavior and the failure of the public's expec-
tations to match actual victim behavior." Id.
38. Id.
39. Tully, supra note 12. "Even though these myths are untrue and are overwhelmingly
refuted by the data, they continue to play an important role in the way judges, jurors, and
others perceive testimony in rape trials." Torrey, supra note 30 at 1015. Moreover, even
though victim credibility is often a central focus of rape trials, "very little empirical evidence
suggests that victims frequently make false accusations." Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at
414.
Empirical studies show that only 2-4% of victims falsely allege that a rape has oc-
curred, which is the same estimated figure for false reporting of all other crimes. Id. at 415.
Furthermore, studies also show that sexual assault trials are very "victim-centric." Ander-
son, supra note 30, at 30-31. Jurors do not focus on the conduct of the defendant on trial but
instead scrutinize the conduct of the victim. Id. Research has indicated that a verdict ren-
dered in a sexual assault trial depends more on the jury's assessment of the victim's "guilt"
than it has to do with its assessment of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 31.
40. Hogan, supra note 16, at 530.
41. Id. at 531.
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Ann Burgess and Lynda Holmstrom, who conducted a six-year lon-
gitudinal study of rape victims in the 1970s, first described the dis-
order.42 The results of the study showed that women43 who have
been raped typically experience two phases of behavior-the acute
phase and the reorganization phase-following their assault.44
During the acute phase, which occurs in the hours immediately
after the rape, victims exhibit either "emotional excitement" or
"emotional flatness .45 About half of victims demonstrate emotional
excitement, which is characterized by crying, anxiety, and even in-
appropriate smiling.46 The other half of victims, however, demon-
strate emotional flatness, which occurs when victims appear sub-
dued, calm, and non-emotional.4 7 The reorganization phase is the
long-term phase that occurs in the weeks, months, and even years
after the rape, and is characterized by victims attempting to cope
with the memory of the rape.4 8 During this phase, victims often
experience fear, nightmares, and phobic reactions .49
42. See id.; Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral Sci-
ence Theory and its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591, 592-93
(2000). Burgess and Holmstrom conducted their study by interviewing 92 rape victims who
had been admitted to the emergency room of Boston City Hospital between July 20, 1972 and
July 19, 1973. Id. at 593. Burgess and Holmstrom interviewed the women upon their ad-
mission to the hospital and then followed up with them through phone calls and home visits
over the next several years. Id. at 594. During the follow-up contacts, Burgess and
Holmstrom asked questions regarding the victim's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Id.
Ninety percent of the ninety-two women originally interviewed at the hospital agreed to the
follow-up contact. Id.
It is important to note that Burgess and Holmstrom's research has been criticized.
See Lauderdale, supra note 20, at 1371-72. Other researchers on the psychological impact
of rape have criticized the methodology used by Burgess and Holmstrom, arguing that the
study did not compare the reactions of victims to a control group of non-victims and that the
sample was selected improperly. Id. at 1372. While Burgess and Holmstrom's initial re-
search may have been deficient in some respects, the "results of recent, methodologically
sound, empirical research reinforce the findings of the early studies." Id. at 1372-73 (citing
four recent studies that comport with Burgess and Holmstrom's initial findings).
43. Burgess and Holmstrom only studied female victims in developing the theory of RTS.
Garrison, supra note 42, at 594. This is not to say that men cannot be victims of rape and
sexual violence. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE (2000). A national study conducted by the United States Department of Justice
revealed that 1 7.6% of women report being raped in their lifetime while 3.0% of men report
being raped in their lifetime. Id. at 14. Accordingly, rapes are overwhelmingly perpetrated
against women, and much of the scholarship on the issue focuses on rape through the lens of
female victimization. See id. at 13-16.
44. Garrison, supra note 42, at 594-95.
45. Hogan, supra note 16, at 531.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Garrison, supra note 42, at 597.
49. Hogan, supra note 16, at 531. For purposes of this note, the second phase of RTS is
less relevant due to the temporal proximity of the first phase. Rape trials often occur within
one to two years of the assault, and therefore much of the focus is placed on the victim's
276 Vol. 54
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Throughout the course of these two phases, particularly the acute
phase immediately following a rape, victims often exhibit counter-
intuitive behaviors.50 One example is the "emotional flatness" re-
action, where a victim appears non-emotional.5 1 This is counterin-
tuitive to the common belief that someone who has experienced a
rape would be crying and hysterical.52 The belief that all victims
react hysterically to rape derives from the myths surrounding soci-
ety's idea of the stereotypical rape, wherein a stranger violently at-
tacks a woman.53 The reality of most rapes, however, is that victims
are assaulted by people they know in their own homes or in the
home of a relative or friend.54 Moreover, most rape victims do not
experience physical force or use of weapons throughout the course
of the attack and are not seriously injured as a result of the attack.55
behavior immediately after the assault rather than the long term effects of the assault. Gar-
rison, supra note 42, at 598-601.
50. Hogan, supra note 16, at 532. In addition, Nina Gupta states:
Rape-trauma syndrome includes many counterintuitive victim behaviors. For exam-
ple, some expect a victim to be hysterical after a rape and may assume that a rape did
not occur if a victim is calm and subdued after the incident. One might also expect a
victim to report a rape immediately after it occurs. Studies indicate, however, that
victims with rape-trauma syndrome will often refuse to acknowledge they have been
raped. Similarly, although one might expect the victim of a traumatic experience to
recall the event in vivid detail, victims may not have a clear memory of the rape. Thus,
rape-trauma syndrome helps to explain a victim's counterintuitive behavior that might
otherwise lead a jury to believe that a victim was not raped.
Nina Gupta, Disillusioning the Prosecution: The Unfulfilled Promise of Syndrome Evidence,
76 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 413, 416 (2014).
51. Hogan, supra note 16, at 532. Emotional flatness can also be referred to as a con-
trolled response to rape. See id. at 531.
52. Id. at 532.
53. Anderson, supra note 30, at 52. For further explanation, see CAROL E. TRACY ET AL.,
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES PANEL ON MEASURING RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS 6 (2012), asserting:
The myths about rape ... perpetuate the idea that a "real rape" only happens when
the rapist is a stranger who raped the victim in a vacant lot, the rape is perpetrated
through the use of force or a weapon, and the victim suffered serious physical injuries
in addition to the penetration, resisted the attack strenuously, and promptly com-
plained to the authorities.
Id.
54. LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN, BARRIERS TO CREDIBILITY: UNDERSTANDING AND
COUNTERING RAPE MYTHS, NATIONAL JUDICIAL EDUCATION PROGRAM, UNDERSTANDING
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO STRANGER AND NON-STRANGER RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT (1994).
55. Anderson, supra note 30, at 6-7. Only 13.8 percent of female victims and 15.1 percent
of male victims report being raped by a stranger. Id. at 7. Only one third of victims report
their rapist using physical force (e.g., hitting, kicking, and choking) during the course of an
attack. Id. Similarly, only one third of victims report experiencing physical injury as a result
of an attack, and in those cases, most injuries were minor. Id. Finally, many victims delay
reporting, if they report at all. See id. at 8 (explaining that only 15% to 20% of rape victims
report their attack to the police).
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Therefore, studies show that it is not unusual for victims to demon-
strate seemingly bizarre behaviors after a traumatic sexual assault
and delay reporting the assault.5 6 For example, it is common for
victims to fail to recall details of an assault, demonstrate an i abil-
ity to tell police the name of the attacker, and show little emotion
following the rape.57
Without expert testimony explaining victim responses to sexual
assault, defense attorneys are able to "capitalize on the public's lack
of knowledge and misconceptions about victim behavior" and argue
to the jury that because the victim did not behave in accordance
with the misconceptions, he or she is not a victim.5 8 Proponents of
the admission of expert testimony argue that such testimony does
not usurp the jury's role as fact-finder but instead "provide[s] jurors
with an accurate context within which to evaluate victim behavior
so that jurors do not misjudge certain conduct as evidence of a vic-
tim's dishonesty and incredibility." 59 Proponents argue that House
Bill 1264 does not tip evidentiary considerations in favor of the
prosecution but rather "level[s] the playing field" so that jurors need
not rely on their preconceived, and often erroneous, notions about
how victims should behave after an assault.60
Over the past several decades, increased state judiciary and state
legislature awareness of the pervasiveness of harmful rape myths
in criminal proceedings prompted legislative and judicial action de-
signed to insulate juries from bias based on preconceived notions.61
These updated standards permit the use of "social framework" tes-
timony offered by expert witnesses in criminal proceedings.62 Social
framework testimony is used to "construct a frame of reference or
56. Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at 424-25.
57. Id.
58. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra note 36. For example, in
the Jeffrey Marsalis case, discussed supra, Marsalis's defense attorney argued that Marsalis
was "not a rapist ... [but] just a playboy." Emrich, supra note 28, at 896 (citing Dan P. Lee,
He Said, They Said, PHILA. MAG., Oct. 2007, at 102, 200-01). Moreover, the fact that none
of the women reported their rapes immediately and some remained in contact with Marsalis
led the defense attorney to instruct the jury that, "a criminal courtroom is [not] the forum for
a woman who regrets having sex with you." Id.
59. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra note 36, at 9.
60. Tully, supra note 12.
61. Hogan, supra note 16, at 533. See generally Lauderdale, supra note 20, at 1376-
1415.
62. JOHN M. CONLEY & JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
237 (2d ed. 2011). Prior to allowing social framework testimony in regards to rape trials,
courts already permitted social framework testimony in a variety of other contexts, including,
but not limited to, eyewitness identification and behaviors of battered women. Id.
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background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolu-
tion of a specific case."6 3 In the context of a rape trial, social frame-
work testimony about RTS is used to "provide much-needed
knowledge about these behaviors to the factfinder so that he or she
is better informed to determine the credibility of the victim." 6 4
Shortly after RTS was first recognized in 1974, prosecutors began
seeking to introduce RTS expert testimony in criminal trials.6 5 At
first, courts were hesitant to admit such testimony and trial judges'
decisions to do so were often overturned on appeal.66 In the past
two decades, however, the national trend has moved toward admit-
ting the evidence.6 7 By 2006, the time at which Pennsylvania began
considering the passage of a bill that would permit RTS expert tes-
timony, Pennsylvania was the only state in the nation to forbid any
type of RTS testimony.68
C. Pennsylvania Law and Jurisprudence
Pennsylvania's delay in allowing admission of RTS expert testi-
mony is not surprising given Pennsylvania's long history of statu-
tory and case law that, at best, has failed to insulate criminal pro-
ceedings from the harmful effects of rape myths and, at worst, has
perpetuated them.69 As early as the Nineteenth Century, Pennsyl-
vania jury instructions encapsulated many of the major rape myths,
providing that a victim's credibility may be determined by consid-
ering whether she physically resisted her attacker and promptly re-
ported the rape to the authorities.70 Pennsylvania laws included
similar myth-driven language.7 1 In 1887, the legislature amended
63. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science
in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987).
64. Hogan, supra note 16, at 533.
65. McCord, supra note 17, at 1156.
66. See, e.g., Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230 (Minnesota case reversing the conviction of a
defendant when the trial court admitted the testimony of a sexual assault counselor, who
testified about victims' typical emotional response to rape); Allewalt v. State, 487 A.2d 664,
670 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), vacated, 517 A.2d 741 (Md. 1986) (Maryland case reversing
on the same grounds); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (Missouri
case reversing on the same grounds).
67. Emrich, supra note 28, at 893 ("Jurisdictions across the country have found a number
of ways to admit such expert testimony without it being unduly prejudicial."). There are
several ways RTS testimony is admitted in rape trials. See generally Hogan, supra note 16,
at 533-42. These approaches are discussed infra in an analysis of Pennsylvania's current
statutory scheme.
68. Emrich, supra note 28, at 893.
69. See generally id. at 899-909.
70. Id. at 904 (citing Stevick v. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 460, 460 (Pa. 1875)) (factors rele-
vant to a victim's credibility include whether "she cried aloud, struggled and complained on




Pennsylvania's criminal code to include a provision that, "if the jury
shall find that [the victim] was not of good repute and that the car-
nal knowledge was with her consent, the defendant shall be acquit-
ted of felonious rape[.]" 72 The statute itself provided that rape had
to be perpetrated "forcibly and against [the victim's] will." 7 3 These
provisions allowed juries to decide cases on the basis of the rape
myths that enforce the notion that rapes are perpetrated with phys-
ical violence and that a woman often invites a sexual assault
through her own conduct.7 4
In the 1960s and 1970s, Pennsylvania's legislators became more
receptive to the true nature of rape cases.7 5 Notably, in 1972, the
Pennsylvania legislature amended its sexual assault laws to in-
clude a series of lesser-included related offenses that covered un-
lawful conduct outside the scope of forcible rape.7 6 Even with the
expanded scope of punishable offenses, the law remained deficient
in several crucial respects.7 7  Particularly, Pennsylvania law ex-
pressly provided that spousal rape was not punishable, permitted
defendants to introduce evidence of victims' promiscuity and prior
sexual behavior, and, perhaps most harmful to victims, required
that victims make a "prompt complaint."7 8
In 2000, Pennsylvania underwent a significant overhaul of its
sexual assault laws.7 9 Significant amendments to the criminal code
included rape shield laws, repeal of the spousal rape provision, and
repeal of the prompt complaint requirement.8 0 Despite these posi-
tive reforms, Pennsylvania still lacked safeguards to protect crimi-
nal trials from harmful rape myths because the legislature had not
yet passed a law, as many other states had, that permitted prose-
cutors to present expert testimony about victims' responses to rape,
particularly within the context of RTS.8 1 In fact, without any stat-
utory authority to guide Pennsylvania courts as to the admission of
expert testimony in sexual assault cases, Pennsylvania developed a
long line of well-established case law serving to render constraints
72. Id. See Commonwealth v. Goodman, 126 A.2d 763, 766 (Pa. Super. 1956).
73. Emrich, supra note 28, at 904.
74. TRACY ET AL., supra note 53, at 6; see also Emrich, supra note 28, at 899.
75. Emrich, supra note 28, at 905.
76. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3122.1 (statutory sexual assault); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3123
(involuntary deviate sexual intercourse); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3126 (indecent assault).
77. Emrich, supra note 28, at 906.
78. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3105.
79. Emrich, supra note 28, at 908.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 909.
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on the admission of expert testimony in sexual assault cases-the
most restrictive in the country.82
The most recent Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case to reiterate
Pennsylvania's extremely restrictive posture on expert testimony in
sexual assault cases was Commonwealth u. Balodis.83 In Balodis,
defendant Peter Balodis, the owner of a Montgomery County hotel,
was convicted of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, statutory
rape, and corruption of a minor stemming from allegations that he
sexually abused a ten-year-old boy staying at his hotel in 1988 and
1989.84 At trial, the Commonwealth presented the xpert testimony
of a clinical social worker who had interviewed the victim in 1989,
shortly after the abuse ended.85 The social worker testified "to the
general characteristics of child sexual abuse victims as those traits
relate to the failure to promptly report abuse, and after the abuse
is reported, to reveal the details of the abuse in stages."86 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with defendant
that the "sole purpose of [the social worker's] testimony was to en-
hance the credibility of [the victim]" and the trial court conse-
quently "invited the jury to abdicate its responsibility to determine
[the victim's] credibility."8 7
From 2000 on, Pennsylvania courts interpreted the Balodis deci-
sion as an absolute ban on expert testimony in sexual assault cases,
finding such testimony constitutes an improper bolstering of victim
82. Id. at 913-16. See Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 836-38 (Pa. 1992) (hold-
ing that expert testimony concerning victim's delay in reporting abuse, omission of details of
the abuse, and inability to recall certain aspects of the abuse was inadmissible because the
content of the testimony was within the jury's "range of common experience" and "infring[ed]
upon the jury's right to determine credibility"); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 547 A.2d 355,
358 (Pa. 1988) (holding that expert testimony regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome's effect on
a victim's ability to identify an attacker was introduced solely to "enhance the credibility of
the victim" and therefore inadmissible); Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa.
1986). But ef. Gallagher, 547 A.2d at 359-61 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority's holding on the grounds that the "average juror does not know about the psychology
and behavioral impact of rape on a rape victim" because "many jurors bring to the courtroom
the myths about rape about which had long influenced our courts. . . .").
In contrast to the highly restrictive standard established by Pennsylvania prior to
2012, i.e., that experts cannot testify to the effect of sexual assault on victims in general,
some jurisdictions allow prosecutors to introduce expert opinion testimony as to whether the
victim in the instant case has exhibited behaviors consistent with abuse. Emrich, supra note
28, at 919.
83. 747 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. 2000).
84. Id. at 342-43.
85. Id. at 343.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 345.
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credibility and usurps the function of the jury.8 8 Finding this re-
striction unjust to victims of sexual assault, Pennsylvania State
Representative Cherelle L. Parker began drafting a bill in 2006 that
would allow for the admission of expert testimony concerning victim
behaviors in sexual assault cases.89 Representative Parker ulti-
mately sponsored House Bill 1264, which "permit[s] an expert to
provide testimony on the counterintuitive behavior indicative of a
rape victim, as well as any recognized form of post-traumatic stress
disorder in sexual assault cases as well as other common psycholog-
ical reactions to trauma."90 House Bill 1264 was slow to gain wide-
spread support in the Pennsylvania General Assembly; it took the
bill nearly six years to pass and become effective as law.91
In the wake of the high-profile indictment, arrest, and prosecu-
tion of former Penn State University assistant football coach Jerry
Sandusky; however, House Bill 1264 quickly gained momentum
and accelerated through the legislative process.92 While in the na-
tional spotlight, the Sandusky trial demonstrated to lawmakers
that Pennsylvania was "missing [an] element" in sex abuse cases as
88. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753, 761 (Pa. 2014) (citing the Balodis
decision for the premise that responses to sexual abuse are "well within the range of common
experience, knowledge, and understanding of a jury, and expert estimony on the matter ...
improperly infringe[s] upon the jury's ability and responsibility to assess the credibility of
[victims]").
89. Tara Murtha, Reality Check: Pennsylvania's Rape Laws Perpetuate the Myths, PHILA.
WKLY. (June 22, 2011), http://www.philadelphiaweekly.com/news-and-opinion/cover-
story/Reality-Check-Pennsylvanias-Rape-Laws-Perpetuate-the-Myths.html. The trial ofJef-
frey Marsalis highlighted Representative Parker's concerns with Pennsylvania's evidentiary
scheme. Id. Marsalis, known as the "Match.com Rapist," was charged with raping twenty-
one women whom he had met online. Emrich, supra note 28, at 891-92. At trial, some of
the victims testified that, after the rapes, they met with Marsalis again, failed to report the
assault to the police, and a few had even continued pursuing a romantic relationship with
Marsalis. Id. at 892. In closing arguments, Marsalis's attorney explained that these behav-
iors simply showed that the women "regrett[ed] having sex with [defendant]" and resorted to
the criminal courts for redress. Id. at 896. Defendant was acquitted of all charges except for
two counts of sexual assault. Murtha, supra. Philadelphia prosecutor Deborah Harley main-
tains that Marsalis was acquitted because "they felt the victims' behavior after the assault
was counterintuitive." Id.
90. Culler, supra note 12.
91. Tully, supra note 12.
92. Id.; Mangino, supra note 18. In one of the highest profile sex abuse trials in recent
history, former Penn State University defensive coordinator Jerry Sandusky was indicted
and subsequently arrested on charges stemming from allegations that he sexually abused
ten young boys for a period of over fifteen years. Viera, supra note 1, at Al. Jerry Sandusky
met all of his victims through his charity, The Second Mile organization, which was estab-
lished to assist underprivileged children. Id. Following a jury trial, Sandusky was convicted
of 45 of the 48 counts related to the allegations of sexual assault. Drape, supra note 3, at Al.
He is currently serving a 30 to 60 year sentence in the Pennsylvania Department of Correc-
tions. Candace Smith et al., Jerry Sandusky Gets 30 to 60 Years for Sex Abuse After Tearful
Victim Statements, ABC NEWS (Oct. 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/jerry-sandusky-
sentenced-30-60-years-prison/story?id= 17427234.
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compared to the rest of the country.93  For example, many of
Sandusky's victims testified that they remained in touch with
Sandusky and continued to visit his home after he began sexually
abusing them, and one victim even sent Sandusky a Father's Day
card while Sandusky was abusing him.94 Noticeably absent from
Sandusky's trial was the use of expert testimony to explain these
seemingly bizarre, counterintuitive behaviors.95 Instead, in accord-
ance with the Balodis decision and the Pennsylvania Jury Instruc-
tions, the jurors were left to rely on their own "common sense" and
"practical knowledge of life as [they had] experienced it" to interpret
these behaviors in determining Sandusky's guilt.96
The Sandusky investigation, indictment, and trial were crucial in
bringing attention to the deficiencies in Pennsylvania's evidentiary
law. 9 7 On June 29, 2012, less than a week after Sandusky's convic-
tion, Governor Corbett signed HB 1264 into law. 98 In its final form,
the law provides, in pertinent part:
(1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a witness
may be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness has
specialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average
layperson based on the witness's experience with, or special-
93. Tully, supra note 12.
94. Culler, supra note 12; Tully, supra note 12.
95. Tully, supra note 12.
96. Balodis, 747 A.2d at 345; see also Role of Jury-Deliberations; Verdict Must be Unan-
imous:
An expert witness is a person who has special knowledge or skill in some science, art,
profession, occupation, or subject that the witness acquired by training, education, or
experience. Because an expert has "special"-that is, "out of the ordinary"-knowledge
or skill, he or she may be able to supply jurors with specialized information, explana-
tions, and opinions that will help them decide a case.
PA. SUGGESTED STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM), §7.05 (2012); Expert Testimony-
Basic Instruction, PA. STANDARD SUGGESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM), §4.10A (2008).
Relying on their common sense and practical knowledge, the Sandusky jury seemed
to have little trouble reconciling the victims' counterintuitive behavior in light of the over-
whelming evidence against Sandusky, including but not limited to the testimony of a multi-
tude of victims, an eyewitness account of the abuse, and inculpatory "love" letters written to
a victim. Viera, supra note 1; Michael Isikoff, Prosecutors have 'bizarre' letters Sandusky
wrote to victim, source tells NBC, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2012), http://us-
news.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/05/12073856-prosecutors-have-bizarre-letters-sandusky-
wrote-to-victim-source-tells-nbc.
The Sandusky case is the exception, however, not the norm. See, e.g., Anderson, su-
pra note 30, at 8 ("Studies reveal that most victims of rape do not promptly complain to the
police or other authorities, most rapes do not produce corroborating evidence, and most jurors
are already cautioned by an underlying societal bias against those who claim rape.").
97. Tully, supra note 12.
98. Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, Goy. Corbett Signs Expert Witness Testimony




ized training or education in, criminal justice, behavioral sci-
ences or victim services issues, related to sexual violence, that
will assist the trier of fact in understanding the dynamics of
sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence and the im-
pact of sexual violence on victims during and after being as-
saulted.
(2) If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to facts
and opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and
victim behaviors.
(3) The witness's opinion regarding the credibility of any other
witness, including the victim, shall not be admissible.
(4) A witness qualified by the court as an expert under this sec-
tion may be called by the attorney for the Commonwealth or
the defendant to provide the expert testimony.99
III. DISCUSSION
A. Compliance with Pa.R.Evid. 702 and Frye
Pennsylvania's law admitting expert testimony on RTS complies
with Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 and the Frye00 standard
for admissibility because the testimony is (1) based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge beyond the realm of the
average layperson's understanding; (2) helps the jury to understand
the evidence or determine a fact in issue, but restricts the expert
from opining as to the fact in issue; and (3) is reliable and generally
accepted in the field of psychology.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissi-
bility of testimony by expert witnesses, provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge is beyond that possessed by the
average layperson; (b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand
99. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b). Section (a) of the statute provides that the statute
applies to sexual offenses under Chapter 31 of the crimes code. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(a).
100. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and (c) the expert's
methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field.101
Subsection (c) reflects Pennsylvania's adoption of the Frye stand-
ard.102 In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia decided Frye v. United States.103 In Frye, the defend-
ant's attorney offered expert testimony104 regarding the defendant's
veracity based on his responses to the "systolic blood pressure de-
ception test."10 5 The trial court, however, excluded the evidence,
and Frye was ultimately convicted of murder.106 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held:
While courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs.107
In holding that a scientific deduction requires general acceptance
in order to be admissible, the court held that the expert's use of the
"systolic blood pressure deception test" to determine veracity had
not yet gained general acceptance as a device for detecting decep-
tion, and the results of the defendant's test were therefore inadmis-
sible.108 In 1977, Pennsylvania adopted the Frye standard in Com-
monwealth v. Topa.109 Since then, Pennsylvania courts interpret
101. PA. R. EVID. 702.
102. PA. R. EVID. 702 (comment).
103. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
104. The expert offered by the defense at Mr. Frye's trial was William Marston, the psy-
chologist who had created the "systolic blood pressure deception test"-an early form of the
polygraph. Heather G. Hamilton, The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States
Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS 201, 203 (Winter 1998).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added); see also Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1197, 1206 (1980) ("Frye envisions an evolutionary process leading to the admissibility of
scientific evidence."); John D. Borders, Jr., Fit to be Fryed: Frye v. United States and the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 77 KY. L.J. 849, 858 (1989) ("The Frye court in effect
created an independent requirement, in addition to the prerequisites of relevancy and help-
fulness to the trier of fact").
108. Borders, supra note 107, at 858; Hamilton, supra note 104, at 203.
109. 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977). It is important to note that many legal scholars have heav-
ily criticized Frye. See Hamilton, supra note 104, at 204 ("Despite its popularity with the
courts . . . the Frye standard was the object of sharp criticism among scholars."); Borders,
supra note 107, at 859 ("the [Frye] test ... has been vigorously criticized, changed, and some-
times rejected"). There are five major criticisms of Frye. Id. at 860. First, "courts have been
inconsistent in characterizing proof as scientific evidence that must meet the Frye test." Id.
Second, courts have struggled to identify the relevant scientific field for evidence. Id. Third,
the "general acceptance" standard renders the test "ambiguous" and "vague." Id. at 860-61.
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the Frye standard as follows: "[N]ovel scientific evidence is admis-
sible . . . [when the evidence] ha[s] gained general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community."110 As recently as 2003, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has reaffirmed its adoption of the Frye stand-
ard.111
1. Scientific, Technical, or Specialized Knowledge
Expert testimony regarding victim responses to sexual assault
satisfies Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702(a) because "the ex-
pert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is beyond
that possessed by the average layperson . . . ."112 Empirical studies
demonstrate that the typical juror lacks adequate knowledge of
rape.113 When comparing results on a questionnaire about sexual
assault, laypersons scored significantly lower than experts.1 14 No-
tably, researchers found that "the scores of the laypeople were al-
Fourth, the test results in a "deprivation of reliable and often outcome-determinative evi-
dence." Id. at 861. See id. (explaining that the deprivation of reliable and outcome-determi-
native evidence is the "most compelling" criticism of the Frye test). Finally, the test's focus
on general acceptance "obscures critical problems in the use of a particular technique." Id.
at 861-62.
Because of these criticisms, federal and state courts began to ignore, modify, or reject
the Frye test. Borders, supra note 107, at 862. By 1990, nearly seventy years after the Frye
decision, Frye "remained viable in only a shrinking minority of the states." Hamilton, supra
note 104, at 206. In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also Hamilton, supra note 104, at 208 ("The
cracks in the foundation of the Frye standard widened when the Supreme Court decided
Daubert"). In Daubert, the Court "escalate[d] the role of Rule 702 in the process of determin-
ing the admissibility of scientific evidence." Hamilton, supra note 104, at 207. The Daubert
court held that "the admissibility of scientific expert testimony did not turn on whether the
expert community in question agreed among themselves that they were in possession of de-
pendable knowledge, but on whether the putative knowledge could be demonstrated to be
valid." Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert
Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS 229, 229 (2000).
110. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 713 A.2d 1117, 1119 (Pa. 1998). In Blasioli, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether the trial court properly admitted an ex-
pert's testimony that DNA testing showed that the DNA profile of the defendant's blood sam-
ple matched that of the semen sample obtained from the victim shortly after she was raped.
Id. at 1118-19. The Court ultimately held that the evidence was properly admitted because
the "product rule" of DNA, which states that the probability of genetic profile occurring ran-
domly is the product of probabilities of each individual allele's occurrence in general popula-
tion, has gained general acceptance across disciplines of "population genetics, human genet-
ics and population demographics." Id. at 1125-27. Notably, the Court considered that there
is often a lack of unanimity among scientists on certain subjects. Id. at 1127. The Court was
therefore careful to note that "unanimity is not required for general acceptance." Id.
111. Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1047 (Pa. 2003) (reaffirming adherence to
the Frye rule).
112. PA. R. EVID. 702(a).
113. Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at 425.
114. Id.
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most no better than chance, as if they had provided completely ran-
dom guesses to the questionnaire."115 These results "suggest hat it
would be helpful to [jurors] to receive more information on reactions
to rape."116 Moreover, the harmful myths about rape on which ju-
rors typically rely underscore the notion that rape is outside the
common knowledge of lay jurors.117 Pervasive rape myths often re-
sult in jurors expecting sexual assault cases to fit their stereotype
of a "real rape," where a woman is attacked by a stranger and suf-
fers injuries.118 Lacking an adequate understanding of rape vic-
tims' behavior, jurors are left to rely on myths about how victims
should respond rather than on accurate, science-based information
on how victims typically do respond.119
For example, defense attorneys for Jeffrey Marsalis, the Phila-
delphia man accused of raping twenty-one women whom he had met
online and subsequently dated, argued that the jurors should con-
sider the fact that many women met with the defendant after the
rapes, failed to report the assaults to the police immediately, and
even continued pursuing a romantic relationship with the defend-
ant after the rapes.120 According to Deborah Harley, the chief of the
Family Violence and Sexual Assault Unit of the Philadelphia Dis-
trict Attorney's Office, the defendant's acquittals on all but two of
his fifty charges can be attributed to the fact that the jury was "not
educated on victim behavior," calling it a "huge obstacle" to the
prosecution of Marsalis.121 Accordingly, expert testimony acts as "a
vehicle for jury education" because victim behaviors are outside the
realm of jurors' common knowledge, especially in light of pervasive
myths about rape that have long colored how society views vic-
tims. 122
115. Lonsway, supra note 35.
116. Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at 425. In a dissenting opinion in Commonwealth U.
Gallagher, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Larsen acknowledged the fact that re-
sponses to sexual assault are typically not within jurors' common knowledge. 547 A.2d 355,
358 (Pa. 1988) (Larsen, J., dissenting). Justice Larsen explained that "[t]he average juror
does not know about the psychological and behavior impact of rape on a rape victim." Id. at
360.
117. Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at 414.
118. Lonsway, supra note 35.
119. Murtha, supra note 89. See also NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION ET
AL., supra note 36, at 8 ("Common victim behaviors are often incomprehensible to laypeople.
Laypeople, therefore, often rely on myths or substitute their own wrong judgments.").
120. Emrich, supra note 28, at 892.
121. Murtha, supra note 89.
122. See Tully, supra note 12.
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2. Helpful to the Jury
Expert testimony concerning victim response to sexual assault
also satisfies subsection (b) of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702
because "the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue . . . ."123 Many opponents voice concerns
that this law allows experts to opine to the ultimate fact in issue,
i.e., whether a rape has occurred, rather than providing testimony
that is helpful to the jury in deciding the ultimate fact in issue.1 2 4
The language of Pennsylvania's statute, however, expressly pro-
vides that "the witness may testify to facts and opinions regarding
specific types of victim responses and victim behaviors [but may not
render] opinion[s] regarding the credibility of any other witness, in-
cluding the victim." 12 5
By restricting expert testimony to behaviors of victims generally,
the legislature ensured that the Commonwealth does not offer ex-
pert testimony to show that a particular victim was truthful.126 Ra-
ther, the testimony "represent[s] a compilation of the experiences of
other victims [that are] extremely helpful to a jury in understand
the behavior of the particular [victim] they are called to judge."1 2 7
Accordingly, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702(b), ex-
pert testimony concerning victim response to sexual assault does
not usurp the jury's ability to determine the ultimate fact in issue;
rather, it provides jurors with a proper and accurate context in
which to evaluate victims' credibility. 128
3. General Acceptance
Lastly, expert testimony concerning victim response to sexual as-
sault also satisfies subsection (c) of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
702, which is the Frye standard for admissibility, because "the ex-
pert's methodology is generally accepted in the relevant field." 129
The two policies underlying the Frye standard are assuring the re-
liability of evidence and assuring that the opponent will have a fair
123. PA. R. EVID. 702(b).
124. Susan Murphy, Assisting the Jury in Understanding Victimization: Expert Psycho-
logical Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 277, 306 (1992).
125. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5960(3)-(4).
126. See Murphy, supra note 124, at 306.
127. Id.
128. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra note 36, at 9.
129. PA. R. EVID. 702(c).
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opportunity to expose weaknesses in such evidence.130 For evidence
to be reliable under Frye, it must be "(1) reliable in the sense of
being valid; (2) it must be reliable in the sense of being consistent;
and (3) its validity and consistency must be generally accepted by
the proper scientific community."131
As required by the first prong of the Frye standard, evidence on
victim response to sexual assault is reliable in the sense that it is
valid.132 Studies concerning victim response to sexual assault are
based on researchers' extensive discussions with individuals who
had sought treatment as a result of rape.133 Because it is highly
unlikely that someone would seek treatment for a rape that did not
occur, researchers can make valid conclusions that the symptoms
resulted from rape.134 Moreover, the fact that similar responses do
not result from consensual sex underscores the validity of such con-
clusions.135
Furthermore, as required by the second prong of Frye, RTS evi-
dence is reliable in the sense that it is consistent.136 Researchers
began to extensively study victims' responses to rape in the early
1970s.137 Since then, many trauma researchers have "conduct[ed]
controlled empirical studies on the psychological reactions to rape
using control groups, larger sample sizes, long-term assessments,
and objective assessment measures," which confirmed early find-
ings regarding victim responses to sexual assault.138 These re-
searchers have come to the conclusion that rape causes certain spe-
cific behaviors in victims, which renders evidence concerning victim
behaviors consistent for purposes of Frye.139
Finally, as required by the third prong of Frye, RTS evidence
demonstrates validity and consistency accepted by the proper sci-
entific community.140 In the context of victim response to sexual
assault, the proper community in which to analyze its acceptance is
the psychological community.141 One of the hallmarks of acceptance
130. McCord, supra note 17, at 1190.
131. Id. at 1191.
132. Id. "[V]alidity depends upon whether the symptoms can be accurately perceived, and
upon whether the existence of the symptoms accurately diagnose rape as the cause of the
symptoms." Id.
133. See id. See also Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at 416.
134. McCord, supra note 17, at 1191.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at 416.
138. Id. at 417.
139. McCord, supra note 17, at 1191.




by the scientific community is the creation of an established treat-
ment plan.142 Behavioral psychologists have long implemented an
established method of treatment based on the results of extensive
studies.1 4 3 Even more compelling, typical victim responses to sex-
ual assault are discussed in DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders) as a subset of Post-Traumatic Stress
Syndrome.1 4 4 Inclusion in the DSM-IV, which serves as the defini-
tive resource on mental disorders used by mental health profession-
als, demonstrates an "unequivocal acceptance" by the scientific
community.145 Accordingly, expert testimony concerning victim re-
sponse to sexual assault satisfies Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
702 and the Frye standard for admissibility.
B. Impact on the Jury's Role as Fact-finder
A critical and heavily debated issue surrounding the admission
of any social framework testimony is the concern that the admission
of such testimony can usurp the jury's role as the sole fact-finder.146
This concern was the basis for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Balodis, where the Court found expert testimony on sex-
ual abuse impermissible because it only served to "enhance the
credibility of [the victim]. "147 The Balodis decision is unsurprising,
given that at the time it was decided in 2000, Pennsylvania was the
only state lacking a statutory framework for the admission of such
testimony.1 4 8
142. Id. at 1192.
143. Id.
144. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).
145. American Psychiatric Association, DSM (2014), http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/
dsm; McCord, supra note 17, at 1192.
146. Tully, supra note 12. See also CONLEY & MORIARTY, supra note 62, at 238 ("Despite
its widespread admission, behavioral science testimony poses difficult questions: whether the
testimony is based on scientifically sound principles; what are sufficient qualifications for a
testifying expert; what is the appropriate scope of the testimony; and whether the testimony
impermissibly interferes with the jury's role in determining credibility.").
147. Commonwealth v. Balodis, 747 A.2d 341, 345 (Pa. 2000). In Balodis, as discussed
supra, a social worker testified to the general characteristics of sexual abuse victims. Id.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that that the "sole purpose of [the social worker's]
testimony was to enhance the credibility of [victims]" and the trial court consequently "in-
vited the jury to abdicate its responsibility to determine [victim's] credibility." Id.
148. Emrich, supra note 28, at 893.
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There are two general frameworks available for admitting expert
testimony of RTS testimony in rape trials: offensive and defen-
sive.149 Within these two general frameworks, there are several av-
enues for admission of RTS testimony.1 5 0 All avenues implicate var-
ying degrees of encroachment on the jury's role as the sole factfinder
in criminal proceedings.15 1  Without any Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decisions determining whether Pennsylvania's tatute for ad-
missibility usurps the jury's role as fact-finder, it must first be de-
termined the type of framework for which the statute provides. Sec-
ond, as a corollary, the specific language used in the statute must
be examined to assess the constraints expressly provided in the
statute.
1. Offensive us. Defensive Dichotomy
In broad terms, RTS testimony is admissible through either an
offensive or a defensive framework.152 The offensive framework,
which is liberal and expansive, permits the introduction of expert
RTS testimony to prove that a rape occurred or, if presented by the
defense, that it did not occur.153 Within the offensive category for
149. See generally Gupta, supra note 50, at 413-31 (the two general frameworks for ad-
missibility typically apply to various types of behavioral testimony).
150. See id.; Boeschen et al., supra note 26, at 424-28 (describing five "levels" of admissi-
bility: (1) testimony on specific behaviors of rape survivors that are described as "unusual"
by the defense, (2) testimony on the common reactions to rape and the general diagnostic
criteria of RTS or PTSD, (3) expert gives an opinion about the consistency of a victim's be-
havior or symptoms with RTS or PTSD, (4) testimony stating that the victim suffers from
RTS or PTSD, and (5) expert opinion that goes beyond a diagnosis). See also Lonsway, supra
note 35, (enumerating the same five levels).
151. See generally Hogan, supra note 16, at 529-57. See also PA. STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (CRIM), § 2.01 (2005) ("You, the jurors, are the sole judges of the facts. It will
be your responsibility, at the end of the trial when you deliberate, to evaluate the evidence,
and from the evidence find what the facts are.").
152. Gupta, supra note 50, at 420-29.
153. Hogan, supra note 16, at 533. "In other words, after an expert diagnoses the victim
with RTS, the State may argue that because the victim suffers from RTS, she must have been
raped." Id. For illustrative purposes, Hogan uses State u. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Kan.
1982) as an example of offensive use of RTS testimony. Hogan, supra note 16, at 534. In
Marks, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld a defendant's conviction for rape where the trial
court permitted a forensic psychiatrist to testify that the victim had been attacked and was
therefore suffering from RTS. 647 P.2d at 1298-99. In justifying its holding, the Court ex-
plained that RTS should be treated as any other type of evidence, stating that it is subject to
cross-examination and can be weighed as the jury sees fit. Id. at 1299.
Hogan also notes that two years later, the Kansas Supreme Court restricted the ap-
plicability of Marks, explaining that "Marks does not ... authorize a medical expert to testify
that in his opinion the complaining witness in a particular case was raped . . . [RTS testi-
mony] is restricted to the victim's state of mind and the existence of [RTS]." Hogan, supra
note 16, at 534 (quoting State v. Bressman, 689 P.2d 901, 908 (Kan. 1984)). Although Bress-
man was intended to clarify Marks, the Marks court did indeed permit exactly what Bress-
man claims is impermissible: the use of RTS testimony to show that a rape occurred. See
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admissibility, there are two avenues through which RTS testimony
can reach the factfinder: (1) diagnostic testimony and (2) offensive
use by the defense.1 5 4 Diagnostic testimony is used to establish that
a sexual assault occurred.155 Most courts do not allow this type of
testimony because it infringes on the jury's role in determining the
ultimate fact in issue, i.e., whether the victim was raped.15 6
In State v. McCoy, 15 7 the West Virginia Supreme Court explained
the adverse consequences of permitting an RTS expert to offer di-
agnostic testimony.15 8 In McCoy, the defendant was accused of rap-
ing the victim, a friend of defendant's wife. 159 On the second day of
defendant's trial, the prosecutor called Lauren McKeown, a rape
crisis counselor.160 The trial court granted the prosecution's motion
Marks, 647 P.2d at 1299 (the forensic psychiatrist testified that the victim had suffered a
"frightening attack").
154. Gupta, supra note 50, at 426-29.
155. Id. at 426. "Thus, offensive use generally occurs in the prosecution's case in chief."
Id. See also Hogan, supra note 16, at 533.
156. Gupta, supra note 50, at 427. See Hogan, supra note 16, at 535 ("admission of diag-
nostic testimony is atypical among jurisdictions in the United States").
157. 366 S.E.2d 731 (W. Va. 1988).
158. Id. at 737.
159. Id. at 732.
160. Id. at 733. At the time of trial, McKeown was the assistant director of a women's
shelter and co-founder and coordinator of a rape crisis counseling team. Id. She held a bach-
elor's degree in sociology and a master's degree in community agency counseling, had re-
ceived training in rape crisis counseling, and had dealt with over one hundred rape cases.
Id. On appeal, the defendant first argued that the lower court erred in finding that McKeown
was qualified as expert to testify about the behavior of rape victims. Id. See W. VA. R. EVID.
702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opin-
ion or otherwise").
The West Virginia Supreme Court found that McKeown "had sufficient knowledge,
training, and experience to qualify under Rule 702 as an expert in the rape counseling area
and that the trial court did not err in so ruling." McCoy, 366 S.E.2d at 733. Although McKe-
own was not a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, as were the experts in cases discussed
supra, courts have found that there are several professions qualified to render RTS opinion
testimony. See generally Lonsway, supra note 35. Medical professionals and mental health
professionals, such as physicians, Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners ("SANE"), psychologists,
and psychiatrists are most commonly called to offer testimony on RTS. See id. Victims'
advocates, law enforcement professionals, counselors, researchers, and even professors, how-
ever, have also been introduced as expert witnesses o long as they demonstrated "expertise
in the dynamics of sexual assault crimes and the impact of sexual assault victimization." Id.
An analysis of who should be permitted to offer RTS testimony is beyond the scope of
this note. It is important to note, however, that constraints in this regard are necessary. The
requirement of "scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge" should conceivably limit who
is qualified to testify on RTS, as discussed in McCoy. Appellate review of cases decided under
§ 5920(b) should provide parameters for Pennsylvania's restrictions on who is permitted to
testify.
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to qualify McKeown as an expert to given an opinion "as to the vic-
tim's reactions subsequent to the alleged assault."161 McKeown tes-
tified that the victim's behaviors, namely her delay in reporting the
rape and the fact that she took several showers after the rape, were
"in conformity with someone who had been sexually assaulted."162
McKeown further added that the victim was "still traumatized by
this experience."1 63
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court explained that
when McKeown took the stand as an expert, "she did not limit her
testimony to the behavior of sexual assault victims generally. Nor
did she limit her testimony to an opinion that [the victim's] behavior
was in conformity with the behavior of others she had treated as
victims of sexual assault."164 Instead, by making the remark that
the victim was "traumatized by this experience," McKeown's testi-
mony was "tantamount o an opinion that [the victim] had, in fact,
been raped by the defendant."165 The court therefore held that
McKeown's testimony that the victim had been raped "encroach[ed]
too far upon the exclusive province of the jury to weigh the credibil-
ity of the witnesses and determine the truthfulness of their testi-
mony."166 The reasoning of the McCoy court has been adopted by
nearly every state and rests on sound policy. 16 7 Allowing an expert
to opine as to whether a victim was raped would eviscerate the need
161. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d at 733.
162. Id. at 737.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 737. See also Lonsway, supra note 35. The types of testimony that the court
described as having been exceeded by McKeown's opinion, i.e., testimony describing victim
behaviors generally and testimony describing whether the victim's behavior was in conform-
ity with the behavior of other victims, constitutes defensive testimony, which will be dis-
cussed infra.
165. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d at 737. "[McKeown's] testimony amounted to a statement hat she
believed the alleged victim, and by virtue of her expert status she was in a position to help
the jury determine the credibility of the most important witness in a rape prosecution." Id.
166. Id. at 737 (citing State v. McQuillen, 689 P.2d 822, 834 (Kan. 1984) (Schroeder, CJ.,
dissenting)). The McCoy court ultimately held:
[Experts] may testify that the alleged victim exhibits behavior consistent with rape
trauma syndrome, but the expert may not give an opinion, expressly or implicitly, as
to whether or not the alleged victim was raped. In this case, the expert's conclusion
that [the victim] was "still traumatized by this experience" was an implicit conclusion
that she had been raped. We, therefore, find that admission of her testimony was
reversible error.
Id.
167. See Lonsway, supra note 35 (testimony that the victim is "telling the truth ... was
raped, or both" is inadmissible in "almost all states"). Lonsway notes that there are some
limited exceptions. Id. One such example would be State u. Marks, 647 P.2d at 1299. It is
important to note, however, that Marks has been further clarified and limited in subsequent
case law, which indicates that states are moving towards an absolute restriction on the ad-




for the jury to determine the ultimate fact in issue, i.e., whether the
rape occurred, and would upset notions of fundamental fairness to
defendants who are indisputably presumed innocent throughout
the course of a criminal trial.168
The second avenue for admissibility of offensive RTS testimony
is the offensive use by the defendant, where the defense seeks to
introduce RTS testimony as substantive proof that a rape did not
occur.169 In this context, the defense presents experts who testify
that the absence of RTS symptoms demonstrates that the victim
was not raped.170 Few courts have addressed this issue, as offensive
evidence is most likely to be introduced through the prosecution
during its case-in-chief to show that a rape did, in fact, occur.171 In
any event, it seems that offensive RTS testimony introduced by the
defense would be subject to the same restrictions as offensive testi-
mony introduced by the prosecutor, as the testimony would speak
to the ultimate fact in issue, i.e., whether a rape occurred.172 Ac-
cordingly, because courts have drastically restricted, and in most
cases, have banned offensive use of RTS testimony, it is unlikely
that courts will find offensive testimony offered by the prosecutor
or a defendant admissible.173
The second framework for admissibility of RTS expert testimony,
the defensive framework, is much more likely to be deemed admis-
sible by the courts.174 The three avenues for admissibility of defen-
sive RTS expert testimony are as follows: (1) rehabilitation of the
168. See generally Lonsway, supra note 35. See also State v. Taylor, where the court held
that an expert:
[W]ent too far in expressing his opinion that the victim suffered rape trauma syndrome
as a consequence of the incident with the defendant . . . and that conclusion vouches
too much for the victim's credibility and supplies verisimilitude for her on the critical
issue of whether defendant did rape her.
663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984).
169. Gupta, supra note 50, at 428.
170. Id. See Kathryn M. Davis, Rape, Resurrection, and the Quest for the Truth: The Law
and Science of Rape Trauma Syndrome in Constitutional Balance With the Rights of the Ac-
cused, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1511, 1529-30 (1998):
Though predominantly employed against the accused, the probative value of RTS is
theoretically available to any party . . . RTS testimony becomes relevant . . . to the
accused when the alleged victim is asymptomatic or her behavior is inconsistent with
the post-rape behavior of other victims of rape who suffer from RTS or rape-related
PTSD.
171. Id. at 1530; see Hogan, supra note 16, at 533. Courts that have addressed this issue
have noted that allowing the defense to introduce RTS testimony presents unique challenges,
such as whether a defendant can compel a victim to undergo a psychological evaluation in
regard to RTS symptoms. See, e.g., State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (Md. 1986).
172. Gupta, supra note 50, at 429.
173. Id.
174. See generally Lonsway, supra note 35; see also Gupta, supra note 50, at 420 ("Syn-
drome evidence is more frequently admitted defensively than offensively in [rape] cases").
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victim, (2) explanation of counterintuitive behaviors, and (3) rebut-
tal to a defense of consent.175 The first avenue, rehabilitation of the
victim, only occurs when the defense has first attacked the credibil-
ity of the victim. 17 6 Unlike offensive RTS expert testimony, how-
ever, defensive testimony cannot be used to "specifically diagnose
the particular victim in the case as suffering from RTS." 177 An ex-
ample of defensive use of RTS expert testimony to rehabilitate the
victim is State v. Robinson.1 7 8
In Robinson, the defendant was accused of attacking the victim
as she was walking from her apartment building to her vehicle.179
According to the victim, defendant grabbed her from behind, threat-
ened her with a knife, and pushed her into the apartment building's
basement, where he raped her.1 80 At trial, the defendant attempted
to "rebut the complainant's testimony [that she was raped] by not-
ing that she was not crying after the assault and that she was so
composed that she was able to write out her own statement at the
police station."181 To rebut this contention, the prosecutor called a
rape crisis counselor who had dealt with approximately seventy to
eighty victims throughout her six years at the center.182 The coun-
selor testified that she "observed that many victims of sexual as-
sault were emotionally flat immediately after the assault and that
she commonly saw an apparent shift in emotions from relative
calmness to agitation in the hours, days, or weeks following the as-
sault."183
The Robinson court held that the expert testimony was admissi-
ble and, additionally, was helpful to the jury because of the defend-
ant's attempt "to capitalize on the misconception that all sexual as-
sault victims are emotional following the assault."184 Accordingly,
175. Gupta, supra note 50, at 420.
176. Id. at 420-21.
177. Hogan, supra note 16, at 535.
178. 431 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1988).
179. Id. at 166.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 172.
182. Id. at 171
183. Id. See also Gupta, supra note 50, at 422 (the expert in Robinson "testified only as
to her observations of the victim's behavior and symptoms and her observations of other sex-
ual-assault victims").
184. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d at 172-73:
We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony
at issue into evidence because where a defendant has suggested to the jury that some
conduct of the victim after the incident is inconsistent with her claim of having been
sexually assaulted, the use of expert testimony in relating observations of the way
other sexual assault victims actually behave serves a particularly useful role by disa-
busing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about sexual assault victims.
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courts have generally held that the defensive use of RTS expert tes-
timony is permissible so long as the witness does not include an
opinion from the expert as to whether the victim was raped or, in
other words, is believable.185 Rendering an opinion as to whether a
victim has been raped enters the realm of offensive RTS testimony,
which, as discussed, is impermissible in nearly every jurisdiction.186
Accordingly, courts must be careful to require experts to be selective
in their choice of words and restrict their testimony to only the char-
acteristics of rape victims generally when rebutting the defense's
attack on a victim's credibility.187
The second avenue for admissibility of defensive RTS expert tes-
timony is testimony that explains the victim's counterintuitive be-
haviors.188 This category is the most restrictive on expert witnesses
and is therefore most favored by the courts.189 The purpose of tes-
timony to explain victims' counterintuitive behaviors is to rebut
misconceptions about rape such that factfinders are "better in-
formed to determine the credibility of the victim." 190 An example of
185. Gupta, supra note 50, at 423 ("Rehabilitation can occur through expert testimony
that merely describes generally the characteristics and symptoms of the victim's behavior
and observations of other victims of sexual assault.").
186. Lonsway, supra note 35; see also Hogan, supra note 16, at 542. Hogan provides a
nuanced analysis of the offensive/defensive dichotomy by noting that defensive testimony has
often entered into the realm of offensive testimony when prosecutors use hypotheticals. Id.
Hogan provides the following example of a prosecutor's hypothetical, taken from State v.
Freeney, 637 A.2d 1088, 1095 (Conn. 1994):
Assume that a [woman] has taken a walk with and had drinks with a casual male
acquaintance who turns suddenly violent against that woman . . . . Assume that the
acquaintance is physically much larger than the woman, assume that the acquaintance
hits and threatens her and issues her orders telling her that she belongs to him ...
and she's to do what he says. Would it be consistent with the patterns of behavior
associated with physical and sexual assault trauma for the woman to walk down the
street, a public street in the company of this man and for her not to call out for help or
try to flee?
Hogan, supra note 16, at 543 (citing Freeney, 637A.2d at 1095). According to Hogan, these
types of hypothetical questions are outside the scope of defensive, rehabilitative RTS testi-
mony. Id. at 544 ("the expert's testimony was defensive only in form, and actually diagnostic
in function"). By including facts unique to the case at bar, the prosecutor "inevitably [made]
one think that the hypothetical victim is the victim in the case." Id. at 543-44. By doing so,
the "expert diagnosed not only the hypothetical victim, but also the actual victim, and effec-
tively told the jury that the victim was raped while vouching for her credibility." Id. at 544.
Accordingly, Hogan argues that the "admission of diagnostic hypotheticals allows inadmissi-
ble RTS testimony to continue to sneak into trials." Id. at 554.
187. Hogan, supra note 16, at 544.
188. Gupta, supra note 50, at 423.
189. Emrich, supra note 28, at 917. See Gupta, supra note 50, at 423 ("Courts generally
allow evidence of [RTS] if it explains how a victim's behavior that seems inconsistent with a
claim of rape is actually consistent with the claim").
190. Hogan, supra note 16, at 533 (explaining that counterintuitive behaviors can be "in-
terpreted as strong evidence that the victim is lying" and can therefore "devastate a victim's
credibility").
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defensive RTS testimony to explain counterintuitive victim behav-
iors is Lessard v. State.191
In Lessard, a defendant, who was a former friend of the victim,
was accused of breaking into the victim's home and raping her.192
Victim admitted that after defendant assaulted her, she "ask[ed]
him not to tell anyone that they had sex."19 3 At trial, a rape crisis
counselor testified that it is common for a victim to ask her attacker
not to say anything about what happened during the assault.194 De-
fendant appealed on the grounds that the rape crisis counselor
"vouched for the truthfulness of the victim which is an invasion of
the province of the jury." 195 The Lessard court held that the expla-
nation given by the expert did not constitute testimony as to the
victim's credibility because the expert did not, at any point in her
testimony, state that she believed the victim's version of events or
believed that a rape had occurred.196 Accordingly, the defensive use
of expert testimony to describe counterintuitive behaviors has been
widely held admissible so long as the expert discusses victim re-
sponse to rape generally and refrains from opining as to whether a
particular victim has been raped.197
The third and final avenue for admitting defensive RTS testi-
mony is rebutting a defense of consent.198 Courts adopting this ap-
proach allow expert witnesses to testify about RTS to assist the jury
in determining if the victim consented to sex with the defendant. 199
An illustrative case in this regard is State v. Huey.200 In Huey, the
defendant, a member of a motorcycle gang, was accused of kidnap-
ping the victim and raping her repeatedly over the course of approx-
imately one week.201 Defendant claimed that the victim consented
to sexual intercourse with him.2 0 2 The prosecution introduced ex-
pert testimony that the victim was suffering an "adjustment reac-
tion" to a "psycho-social stressor."203 The expert did not use the
term RTS at any point during his testimony, but instead provided
"general observations of stress."20 4 The court held that the expert
191. 719 P.2d 227, 233-34 (Wyo. 1986).
192. Id. at 229.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 233.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 234.
197. Gupta, supra note 50, at 424.
198. Id.
199. Emrich, supra note 28, at 918.
200. 699 P.2d 1290, 1295 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
201. Id. at 1291-92.
202. Id. at 1293.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1293-94.
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testimony was admissible and further explained that evidence re-
ferring to RTS directly would be permitted as well because the case
involved an issue of consent.205 Similar to the constraints on other
types of defensive testimony, RTS testimony used to rebut the de-
fense's consent argument may not include testimony about whether
or not the victim was raped.206
Accordingly, the two broad general frameworks and the five sub-
sets of those frameworks have been met with differing levels of ac-
ceptance by the courts.207 Courts are much more likely to admit
RTS testimony for a defensive use, i.e., rehabilitation of the victim,
explanation of counterintuitive behaviors, and rebuttal to a defense
of consent, than for offensive use, i.e., diagnostic testimony used by
both the prosecution and defense.208
2. Pennsylvania's Statutory Scheme
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet analyzed the cate-
gorical framework Pennsylvania has adopted through its enact-
ment of 18 Pa. Con. Stat. § 5920(b), although its 2015 Common-
wealth v. Olivo 2 0 9 decision has suggested a future analysis the Court
may employ should defendants challenge their convictions on the
grounds that § 5920 constitutes an improper encroachment on the
jury's role as factfinder.210 In Olivo, defendant Jose Luis Olivo was
charged with, inter alia, two counts of rape and two counts of invol-
untary deviate sexual intercourse, stemming from allegations that
he sexually abused his girlfriend's seven-year-old daughter.211
205. Id. at 1294.
206. Emrich, supra note 28, at 918.
207. Gupta, supra note 50, at 414 ("Courts differ greatly in their approaches to the admis-
sibility of syndrome evidence").
208. See id. ("Admissibility varies with the purpose for which the evidence is offered; de-
fensive use of syndrome evidence is more widely accepted than offensive use, which is rare").
209. 127 A.3d 769 (Pa. 2015).
210. Id. at 769. The Superior Court has, however, addressed the issue of whether § 5920
permits improper bolstering of victims' testimony. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Terantino,
2015 WL 7300127, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2015). In Terantino, defendant was accused
of sexually assaulting his fourteen-year-old step daughter. Id. At trial, the prosecution called
witness Carol Haupt, who specialized in treating perpetrators and victims of sexual assault.
Id. Haupt testified that "[m]ost victims don't report for a very long time if ever" because of
"shame, fear, embarrassment, thinking they may get in trouble themselves, not knowing who
to tell, being afraid that they won't be believed . . . ." Id. Haupt had never met the victim
and did not testify about the victim specifically. Id. On appeal, defendant argued that
Haupt's testimony improperly bolstered the credibility of the victim. Id. In its analysis, the
Superior Court cited the language of § 5920 that expressly forbids discussing the credibility
of the victim and summarily held that, based on the facts of the case at issue, Haupt did not
do so. Id. at *2. The Superior Court declined to establish or recommend parameters to be
applied in future cases. See id.
211. Olico, 127 A.3d at 770-71.
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Prior to his trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the
Commonwealth from introducing expert estimony under § 5920 re-
garding the victim's response to the sexual abuse.212
The defendant did not argue that the statute usurped the jury's
role as factfinder, but instead argued that the statute unconstitu-
tionally infringed on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's exclusive
authority over procedural rulemaking under Article V, Section 10(c)
of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 1 3 Alternatively, defendant ar-
gued that, even if the legislature could enact evidentiary rules, §
5920 was improper because it was in direct contravention with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Dun-
kle,2 14 where the Court held inadmissible "expert estimony con-
cerning typical behavior patterns exhibited by sexually abused chil-
dren."215 In so holding, the Dunkle Court explained that victims'
responses to sexual abuse were "easily understood by lay people and
did not require expert analysis."216
The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted his motion
in limine to exclude the expert testimony.217 Interestingly, the trial
court observed that the expert testimony would have been relegated
to victim behaviors generally and would have been helpful to the
jury, but nonetheless found that rules governing the proper admis-
sion of evidence are solely "in the province of the Pennsylvania Su-
212. Id. at 771.
213. Id. Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has "exclusive power to enact procedural rules, and a law inconsistent
with such a rule is suspended." Commonwealth v. McMullen, 961 A.2d 842, 848 (Pa. 2008).
Subsection (c) of Section 10 provides the following:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice,
procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers serving
process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the peace,
including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of actions
or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall require, and
for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of all courts and
supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch, if such rules are consistent with this
Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any lit-
igant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any
court or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose.
All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules pre-
scribed under these provisions. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the
General Assembly may by statute provide for the manner of testimony of child victims
or child material witnesses in criminal proceedings, including the use of videotaped
depositions or testimony by closed-circuit television.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
214. 602 A.2d at 830.
215. Olico, 127 A.3d at 771 (citing Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 831).
216. Id. (citing Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 836).
217. Id. at 772.
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preme Court under Article V, [Section] 10 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution."218 The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's deci-
sion, arguing that although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
exclusive power to implement procedural rules, evidentiary rules
are a well-recognized exception to the general rule.219 Therefore,
the central issue before the Court was whether § 5920 constituted
an "impermissible procedural rule" or a "proper exercise of legisla-
tive authority to enact a rule of evidence."220 To determine whether
§ 5920 was an impermissible procedural rule in violation of Article
V, Section 10, the Court explained that the "the threshold inquiry.
is whether the statute is procedural or substantive in nature."221
Analogizing to Commonwealth v. Newman,222 which addressed a
statute involving martial privilege, the Court held that "Section
5920 is clearly a rule of evidence, which we have acknowledged can
be governed by statute."223 Further, the Court explained that §
5920 was "substantive rather than procedural as it permits both
parties to present experts to testify to facts and opinions regarding
specific types victim responses and victim behaviors . . . . It does
not dictate how the evidence is presented.. ."224 As such, the Court
ultimately concluded that the enactment of § 5920 was well within
the province of the General Assembly and did not constitute a vio-
lation of Article V, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.2 25
In addressing defendant's argument that § 5920 ran in direct con-
travention to the Court's holding in Dunkle, the Court explained
that the Dunkle decision "hinged on the Court's consideration of the
research supporting the admission of evidence."226 It further noted
that the decision was based on admissibility considerations, such as
whether the evidence was within the knowledge of a lay juror, not
on constitutional considerations regarding the General Assembly's
authority to pass a statute governing such testimony.227 Accord-
ingly, in addressing defendant's alternative argument, the Court
determined that § 5920 did not violate its decision in Dunkle.228
In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice Eakin addressed the
statute within the context of its encroachment on the jury's role as
218. Id.
219. Id. at 773.
220. Id. at 777.
221. Id.
222. 633 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 1993).





228. Id. at 781.
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factfinder, asserting that the statute improperly "permits expert
witnesses to influence a jury's determination of victim's credibility
under the guise of educating jurors on the varying reactions to sex-
ual violence . . . . s229 u tice Eakin posited that, although § 5920
facially precludes comments regarding credibility, the expert testi-
mony will nevertheless "weigh directly on a victim's credibility, fun-
damentally altering the exclusive function of the jury." 230 The dis-
sent acknowledged that the testimony allowed under § 5920 is help-
ful to the jury in understanding victims' response to sexual assault,
but noted that it had "no bearing on the underlying facts of an as-
sault [and does not] establish whether an accused actually commit-
ted a crime."2 3 1 Rather, the dissent explains, the testimony directly
and improperly either bolsters or attack's a victim's credibility and
has no other purpose in the sexual assault trials.232
The Olivo dissent suggests that Pennsylvania has adopted an im-
permissible framework governing the admissibility of expert testi-
mony in sexual assault cases.233 The majority declined to address §
5920 within the context of whether it usurped the jury's role as fact-
finder and instead limited its analysis to the central issue raised by
the defendant-whether § 5920 was made pursuant to proper rule-
making procedures under the Pennsylvania Constitution.234 The
dissent, however, provides insight into possible rationale the Court
may adopt or, at the least, entertain should a defendant challenge
§ 5920 on the grounds that it encroaches on the jury's responsibility
to determine the ultimate fact in issue of the case.2 3 5 To analyze
Pennsylvania's framework and determine whether it is an improper
means of bolstering victims' credibility, the statutory language pro-
vides the basis of the analysis.236
Subsection (1) reflects the familiar requirement of Pennsylvania
Rule of Evidence 702 subsections (a) and (b). 2 3 7 Rule 702(a) pro-
vides that an expert witness rendering an opinion is to base his or
her opinion on "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
. . . beyond that possessed by the average layperson."238 Using
nearly analogous language, § 5920(b)(1) provides that the a witness




233. See id. at 782-83.
234. Id. at 777.
235. See Olico, 127 A.3d at 782-83.
236. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b).
237. PA. R. EVID. 702(a)-(b).
238. PA. R. EVID. 702(a).
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"may be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness has spe-
cialized knowledge beyond that possessed by the average layperson
based on the witness's experience with, or specialized training or
education in, criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim services
issues, related to sexual violence."239 Unlike most statutory author-
ity and case law,2 4 0 § 5920 expounds upon which professional fields
are appropriate for introducing RTS testimony, noting witnesses
with experience in the fields of "criminal justice, behavioral sciences
or victim services issues, related to sexual violence" may be quali-
fied to render such testimony.241
Rule 702(b) provides that an expert witness's opinion testimony
must "help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue . . . ."2 4 2 Again, using language nearly analogous
to Rule 702(b), § 5920(b)(1) reflects the familiar "helpfulness" re-
quirement of Rule 702(b) by providing that an RTS expert's testi-
mony must "assist the trier of fact in understanding the dynamics
of sexual violence, victim responses to sexual violence and the im-
pact of sexual violence on victims during and after being as-
saulted."243 It is important to note that the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture was careful to include the specific facts in issue to which the
testimony may be helpful-the dynamics of sexual violence, victim
responses to sexual violence, and the impact of sexual violence on
victims during and after being assaulted.244 At no point does the
Pennsylvania Legislature include a provision allowing experts to
testify in an offensive manner, i.e., "diagnostic testimony."
Therefore, subsection (1) of § 5920(b) avoids the problems associ-
ated with offensive RTS testimony as discussed in McCoy, where
the court held that the expert's testimony that the victim had been
239. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(1).
240. See, e.g., McCoy, 366 S.E.2d at 733 (explaining that a rape crisis counselor "had suf-
ficient knowledge, training, and experience to qualify under Rule 702 as an expert in the rape
counseling area and that the trial court did not err in so ruling," but neglecting to expound
upon other professional fields that would be appropriate for admission of expert testimony
on RTS).
241. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(1). See generally Lonsway, supra note 35. Medical
professionals, mental health professionals, victims' advocates, law enforcement profession-
als, counselors, researchers, and even professors, have been introduced as expert witnesses
so long as they demonstrated "expertise in the dynamics of sexual assault crimes and the
impact of sexual assault victimization." Id. As discussed supra, appellate review of cases
wherein the trial court admitted testimony under § 5920 will better define the parameters of
who is qualified to testify, but Pennsylvania's law provides guidance as to the general pro-
fessional fields best suited to render such testimony. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(1).
242. PA. R. EVID. 702(a)-(b).
243. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(1).
244. Id.
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raped usurped the jury's role as the sole factfinder in the defend-
ant's criminal rape trial.2 4 5 By limiting the scope of testimony to
that which would be helpful to the jury in understanding the dy-
namics of sexual violence and victim response to sexual assault gen-
erally, subsection (1) of § 5920 supports the conclusion that Penn-
sylvania has adopted a restrictive, type-2 defensive framework
which permits expert RTS testimony to explain counterintuitive be-
haviors.2 4 6
Pennsylvania's standard for admissibility is most analogous to
the framework discussed in Lessard, where the court upheld the
admission of testimony by a rape crisis counselor who explained
that, generally, it is common for a victim to ask her attacker not to
say anything about what happened during the assault.247 At no
point did the counselor state that she believed the victim's version
of events or believed that a rape had occurred.2 4 8  Similarly, §
5920(b)(1) only permits the admission of testimony concerning the
dynamics of sexual violence and victim response to sexual assault
generally, rather than in the specific context of the victim's re-
sponse in the case at issue.249 Accordingly, subsection (1) of §
5920(b) supports the conclusion that Pennsylvania has adopted the
''most restrictive" and "most favored" framework for admission of
RTS testimony.250
Subsection (2) of § 5920 also appears to support the conclusion
that Pennsylvania has adopted a type-2 defensive framework with
regards to the admissibility of RTS testimony, although the lan-
guage may require some judicial clarification.2 5 1 Subsection (2) pro-
vides further parameters for the scope of RTS expert testimony by
providing that "the witness may testify to facts and opinions regard-
ing specific types of victim responses and victim behaviors."2 52 Be-
cause the offensive/defensive dichotomy turns on whether or not the
evidence is being offered to describe victims generally or particu-
larly, the word "specific" could be the source of confusion at the trial
level.2 5 3 It appears, however, that the term "specific" is intended to
qualify "behaviors," rather than "victims."2 5 4 Accordingly, on its
245. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d at 737 (citing McQuillen, 689 P.2d at 834 (Schroeder, C., dis-
senting)).
246. Gupta, supra note 50, at 420.
247. Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233-34 (Wyo. 1986).
248. Id. at 234.
249. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(1).
250. Emrich, supra note 28, at 917.
251. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(2).
252. Id.
253. Id. See generally Gupta, supra note 50, at 420-29.
254. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(2).
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face, subsection (2) provides that the witness may testify to specific
victim behaviors; e.g., delays in reporting, a lack of crying or hyste-
ria, or failure to recall details of an assault.255 Courts, however,
may interpret subsection (2) as permitting the witness to testify to
victims' specific behaviors.256 Such a reading would interpret the
statute as providing for offensive, diagnostic testimony, which
would present serious, and possibly reversible, errors for consider-
ation of the appellate courts.257
Subsection (3) of § 5920(b) may provide guidance as to the inter-
pretation of subsection (2).258 Subsection (3) provides a specific con-
straint on the scope of RTS opinion testimony by explaining that
"[t]he witness's opinion regarding the credibility of any other wit-
ness, including the victim, shall not be admissible."259 This subsec-
tion protects the statute from permitting experts to render credibil-
ity determinations from the stand, which the vast majority of courts
have expressly prohibited in the context of RTS expert testimony.260
Although the statute expressly forbids credibility testimony, the
ambiguity remains as to whether the expert may specifically dis-
cuss the victim. 2 6 1 Courts, however, have held that allowing an ex-
pert to discuss whether the victim in the case at issue has demon-
strated behaviors consistent with sexual assault, even without ren-
dering an opinion as to whether the victim suffered a sexual as-
sault, have essentially permitted the expert to make a credibility
determination.2 6 2 Because of existing case law from other states, it
255. See id.
Rape-trauma syndrome includes many counterintuitive victim behaviors. For exam-
ple, some expect a victim to be hysterical after a rape and may assume that a rape did
not occur if a victim is calm and subdued after the incident. One might also expect a
victim to report a rape immediately after it occurs. Studies indicate, however, that
victims with rape-trauma syndrome will often refuse to acknowledge they have been
raped. Similarly, although one might expect the victim of a traumatic experience to
recall the event in vivid detail, victims may not have a clear memory of the rape. Thus,
rape-trauma syndrome helps to explain a victim's counterintuitive behavior that might
otherwise lead a jury to believe that a victim was not raped.
Gupta, supra note 50, at 413-31.
256. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(2).
257. See Gupta, supra note 50, at 427; see, e.g., State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731, 737 (W.
Va. 1988) (finding reversible error where the court permitted a rape crisis counselor to ex-
plain that a specific victim was "traumatized by this experience," thereby rendering her opin-
ion testimony "tantamount to an opinion that [the victim] had, in fact, been raped by the
defendant").
258. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(2)-(3).
259. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(3).
260. Gupta, supra note 50, at 427. See Hogan, supra note 16, at 535 ("admission of diag-
nostic testimony is atypical among jurisdictions in the United States").
261. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(2)-(3).
262. See, e.g., People v. Wells, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 763 (Cal. App. 4th 2004). In Wells,
defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting two minor, female relatives. Id. at 763-65.
At trial, the prosecutor called Dr. Anthony Urquiza, who was qualified as an expert in child
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appears that the subsection (3) bar on credibility testimony likely
also bars testimony as to particular victims' behaviors.263 Accord-
ingly, subsections (2) and (3) support the conclusion that Pennsyl-
vania has adopted a type-2 defensive framework, restricting expert
testimony to victim behaviors in general for the limited purpose of
dispelling rape myths that may negatively influence jurors.264
Although subsection (4) does not provide support for an analysis
of the framework in which Pennsylvania has adopted, it is nonethe-
less a critical point of inquiry.265 Subsection (4) explains who may
introduce RTS expert witnesses, stating: "A witness qualified by the
court as an expert under this section may be called by the attorney
for the Commonwealth or the defendant to provide the expert testi-
mony."2 6 6 As discussed in the previous section, there are concerns
that allowing the defense to introduce RTS testimony presents
unique challenges, such as whether a defendant may compel a vic-
sexual abuse. Id. at 767. Dr. Urquiza testified as to common responses to sexual abuse, such
as child victims' frequent failure to disclose abuse immediately exhibited by child victims
generally. Id. Dr. Urquiza also explained that when children do disclose, they typically do so
over extended periods of time during which children progressively reveal more about the
abuse, and, as children grow more comfortable with discussing the abuse, their stories often
vary with each time they retell them. Id. Dr. Uriquiza did not testify in regard to the be-
havior of the two child victims involved in the case at issue. Id.
After Dr. Urquiza's testimony, the defendant presented the testimony of Dr. Dianne
Sullivan Eversteine, who had reviewed videotapes of one of the victims. Id. at 768. Dr.
Eversteine stated that she intended to testify that one of the child victims was not "ex-
hibit[ing] the emotional reaction one would expect from a petite girl who had been raped by
a large man." Id. Ultimately, Dr. Eversteine explained to the court that she would testify
that the victim's demeanor was "inconsistent with having suffered trauma." Id.
The trial court refused to admit such testimony, and the defendant appealed on the
grounds that the refusal constituted reversible error. Id. Relying on prior decisions in the
California state courts, the appellate court in Wells held that the expert testimony was only
admissible for the limited purpose of "disabusing a jury of misconceptions it might hold about
how a child reacts to molestation." Id. at 769. Accordingly, the court found that Dr. Ever-
steine's proposed testimony was outside the permissible scope of expert testimony concerning
victim response to sexual abuse. Id. at 770.
In its analysis, the court drew critical distinctions between the types of testimony
offered by Dr. Urquiza and Dr. Eversteine. Id. at 770-71. According to the Court, Dr. Ur-
quiza's testimony was permissible because he merely explained the typical responses to sex-
ual abuse without "tying his testimony to either of the complaining witnesses." Id. at 770.
Conversely, Dr. Eversteine's proposed testimony would have permitted her to "render an
opinion as to whether [the victims were] truly molested." Id. at 770-71. Accordingly, the
Court asserted that, "[b]ecause the jury would likely have understood Dr. Eversteine's pro-
posed testimony about 'usual' reactions from a trauma victim as a veiled opinion that [the
victim], who did not exhibit such 'usual' behaviors, was not truly molested, the trial court
properly excluded this testimony. . . ." Id.
263. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(3).
264. See Gupta, supra note 50, at 422.
265. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(4).
266. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b).
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tim to undergo a psychological evaluation in regard to RTS symp-
toms.2 6 7 There are also negative implications, however, when
courts refuse to afford the defense an equal opportunity to present
RTS expert testimony.268
Because Pennsylvania's statutory scheme likely provides for a
type-2 defensive framework, these concerns are not implicated.269
First, Pennsylvania's framework will allow for an expert to render
his or her opinion without examining the victim because the frame-
work only permits the admission of testimony concerning victim be-
haviors generally, rather than that of the victim in the case at is-
sue.270 Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike will be limited to
inquiring as to how victims, in general, respond to rape.27 1 Accord-
ingly, neither prosecutorial nor defensive use of RTS testimony will
necessitate interviewing the victim; if confined to the proper scope
of type-2 defensive testimony, the expert can render a permissible
opinion based on their observation of victims generally throughout
the course of their training and experience.272
Second, concerns about the defendant being deprived of a fair op-
portunity to present its own experts are undoubtedly not present
due to the plain language of § 5920(b)(4).273 Subsection (4) expressly
provides that an RTS expert "may be called by the attorney for the
Commonwealth or the defendant to provide the expert testimony,"
negating any concern in regard to the equal opportunity to admit
RTS testimony.274
267. See, e.g., State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741, 751 (Md. 1986) ("[W]e can foresee cases
where the defendant will seek to counter the State's PTSD evidence with his own expert
testimony [which] can, in turn, lead to issues concerning compulsory psychiatric examination
of the complainant by an expert for the defense").
268. See, e.g., Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 1989). In Henson, the defend-
ant called a psychiatrist, Dr. David Glover, to testify about victim behaviors after rape. Id.
at 1191. During Dr. Glover's testimony, the defense asked the following question:
Doctor, in your professional opinion, a person who has allegedly suffered a traumatic,
forcible rape, would it be consistent in your experience that a person who had gone
through a situation such as that would go back to the same place the act allegedly
occurred and socialize, drink, dance, on the same day of the alleged act?
Id. The prosecution objected, and the trial court sustained the objection on the grounds that
the testimony was not relevant and a proper foundation had not been laid. Id. Defendant
was convicted of rape and appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred by not allowing
Dr. Glover's testimony. Id. at 1190-91. The Supreme Court of Indiana agreed, holding that
"to bar the defendant from presenting such evidence exceeds the discretion of the trial court;
and, in this case, the trial court's ruling impinged upon the substantial rights of appellant to
present a defense and was reversible error." Id. at 1194.
269. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(1)-(3).
270. See Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 234 (Wyo. 1986).
271. See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Ind. 1989).
272. See Lessard, 719 P.2d at 234.
273. See Henson, 535 N.E.2d at 1194.
274. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5920(b)(1)-(3).
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Accordingly, the express language of § 5920(b) and existing case
law addressing similar constraints on RTS testimony indicates that
Pennsylvania has adopted a type-2 defensive framework.275 This
framework is the most restrictive, and therefore the most favored
by the courts.276 By allowing experts to discuss victim responses
generally while prohibiting the experts from discussing the victim
in the case at issue specifically, Pennsylvania has taken steps to
protect the rights of the accused while also insulating criminal tri-
als from harmful rape myths.277 Section 5920 therefore permits the
admission of testimony that is helpful in providing the jury with the
proper framework to determine credibility without permitting ex-
perts to render credibility determinations from the stand.278
C. Potential for Unfair Prejudice
The final and most common concern with the admission of RTS
testimony is the belief that admission of such testimony is unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant.279 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403
permits a court to exclude relevant evidence if "its probative value
is outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."280
Unfair prejudice is a "tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing
the evidence impartially."281 Many opponents of the admission of
RTS testimony believe that jurors give RTS expert testimony spe-
cial weight because such testimony "creates an aura of special reli-
ability and trustworthiness."282
Empirical studies, however, demonstrate that the effects of ex-
pert testimony on jury decisions are minimal.283 In a 1985 study,
two groups of mock juries listened to a taped reenactment of an ac-
tual rape trial and deliberated to a unanimous verdict.284 One
group was a non-expert control group.285 The study predicted that
275. Id.
276. Emrich, supra note 28, at 917.
277. Hogan, supra note 16, at 533.
278. Id.
279. Patricia A. Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of Case
Law and Psychological Research, 16 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAv. 293, 297 (1992).
280. PA. R. EVID. 702.
281. PA. R. EVID. 702 (comment).







if jurors gave undue weight to expert testimony, they would be more
likely to render a guilty verdict.286 The study ultimately revealed
that the effects of expert testimony on juror decisions were "quite
small."2 8 7 Further, there were no significant differences in juror
ability to recall case facts.288 Finally, mock jury deliberations re-
vealed that jurors did not always perceive expert testimony in a
positive light.2 8 9
A 1988 study resulted in similar findings, showing that the ex-
pert testimony did not affect the "favorability of discussions of the
defendant's credibility."290 The testimony did, however, lead jurors
to rate the complainant as more credible than jurors who had not
heard expert testimony.291 The scientists conducting the study in-
terpreted these findings as demonstrating that "rather than being
prejudicial to the defendant, the expert testimony seemed to coun-
teract the otherwise pervasive effects of rape myths on juror judg-
ments."292 Taken together, the two students suggest that although
the expert testimony does influence juror decision making to an ex-
tent, it does not appear that jurors give the testimony undue weight
such that it is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant.293
IV. CONCLUSION
The importance the 2012 enactment of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5920 cannot
be overstated. For years, Pennsylvania lagged behind its sister
states in adopting a law or deciding a case permitting the admission
of expert testimony to explain victim behaviors in sexual assault
cases. As such, victims in the Pennsylvania criminal justice system
were subjected to defenses that frequently exploited their counter-
intuitive behaviors, submitting to jurors that the fact that victims
did not resist their attacker, cry out for help, or immediately report
their attack to authorities meant they were not worthy of belief.
Prior to the passage of § 5920, Pennsylvania allowed for victims and
their behaviors to be put on trial, rather than defendants.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Frazier & Borgida, supra note 279 at 302.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 303.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. See also Hogan, supra note 16, at 540 ("studies demonstrate that although expert
syndrome evidence influenced the judgments of the jurors, jurors have considered expert tes-
timony as less important and less helpful than lay testimony").
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Although the positive aspects of § 5920 are evident, concerns re-
main. The advantage that § 5920 provides to victims must be bal-
anced with the rights of the accused. It appears that Pennsylvania
has carefully balanced these interests through the adoption of a
type-2 defensive framework for admission of RTS testimony. With-
out any guidance from Pennsylvania appellate courts, it appears
that RTS experts in Pennsylvania will be limited to testifying about
victim response in general as gleaned from training and experience.
This restriction allows experts to provide the jury with a proper
framework for analysis of victim credibility, while refraining from
rendering an opinion as to a particular victim's credibility.
In the coming years, Pennsylvania courts will undoubtedly define
the exact parameters of the scope of expert testimony. Pennsylva-
nia courts must decide, just as courts in other states have been de-
ciding for decades, how far experts may go in touching upon the case
at issue, particularly through the use of hypotheticals. Given Penn-
sylvania's extremely restrictive history on social framework testi-
mony, it would not be surprising if Pennsylvania continued the
trend by restricting experts to discussing behaviors generally, with-
out any reference to a hypothetical situation similar to that present
in the case at issue. Reference to hypotheticals similar to the case
at issue can enter the realm of offensive RTS testimony, which the
vast majority of courts reject as inadmissible.
At its essence, § 5920 will be crucial in leveling the playing field
for victims of sexual assault, regardless of where Pennsylvania
draws its parameters. Although it took Pennsylvania decades to
pass a law similar to those widely accepted nationwide, the old ad-
age, "better late than never" is fitting. While Pennsylvania has
failed victims of sexual assault in the past by refusing to insulate
their attackers' trial from harmful rape myths, Pennsylvania can
now look toward the future. With the passage of § 5920, Pennsyl-
vania courtrooms will no longer be places where victims must un-
dergo scrutiny for the things they did, but places where victims can
seek redress for the things that others have done to them.
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